Risks of a Libyan No-Fly Zone

RANIER FSADNI penned a brilliant article in today’s Times of Malta analysing the risks of a Libyan No-Fly Zone. He has kindly agreed for J’accuse to reproduce this article here as a Zolabyte:

As I write (Tuesday morning), Muammar Gaddafi is advancing east towards a showdown with Benghazi. Pressure is growing on the United Nations’ Security Council to approve the imposition of a no-fly zone in Libya.

The case is being made by the Libyan rebels as well as (most prominently) by France, the UK and the Arab League. The US has been troubled, however, by the consideration that military action could end up bolstering Libyan support for Col Gaddafi.

One can see why. At least three of the major assumptions behind the request are not as solid as they look.

First, it is assumed that the battle for Libya is a fight between the Libyan people, as a whole, and Col Gaddafi’s militias. However, there are important western centres that have conspicuously not committed themselves.

There is Tarhuna, with its major tribe, the Ferjan. There is Bani Walid, centre of the Warfalla, said to be a million strong. And there are the two major tribes of the south, the Magarha and the Awlad Suleiman. Between them, these tribes dominate large parts of Tripolitania, down to the south proper. If they take a stand, several smaller tribes are likely to join them.

All four have branches settled in Sirte and its hinterland, which means they are settled on the major boundary the rebel army in the east has to cross. And they are inter-married with Col Gaddafi’s tribe, the Gadadfa.

They have not taken a formal stand for Col Gaddafi. (However, on Tuesday, Libyan state TV announced a letter of support from a group of unnamed representatives of Tarhuna.) But neither have they taken an unequivocal stand with the rebels. Occasional reports concerning the Warfalla have come to nothing so far.

So, what would these tribes do in the face of the considerable military aggression needed to impose a no-fly zone? They all have a proud history of anti-colonial struggle. So do the tribes of the east but the imposition of a no-fly zone is more likely to afflict the western tribes with inevitable “collateral damage”, the accidental killing of civilian men, women and children.

I’m not sure anyone knows the answer to that question. But if Col Gaddafi persuades that the allied attacks constitute imperial aggression, the no-fly zone could end up sparking the civil war that has so far been avoided.

The second assumption is that the rebels do want a no-fly zone. They are, of course, explicitly requesting it and recognising that it would entail bludgeoning attacks on Libyan territory. But it is not clear their understanding of one of their key conditions – no foreign ground troops – is the same as that of, say, a supporter like US Senator John Kerry.

When one of the rebel leaders sought to illustrate what he meant, he said that, of course, if a foreign pilot’s plane was shot down, it would be all right if he parachuted himself down to Libyan territory – “he would be our guest”. It is indicative of how strictly the rebels reject the idea of foreign ground troops that it was thought worth pointing out that concession.

In any case, however, the likelihood is that a pilot would bail out far closer to Col Gaddafi’s forces.

And the record of the US and UK armies is that they send troops on helicopter gunships to rescue soldiers stranded behind enemy lines. Nor is it to be excluded (a notorious case arose in Afghanistan) that stranded soldiers may need to decide, at short notice, whether to kill civilians who have accidentally discovered their hideout.

In short, the distinction between a no-fly zone and ground troops could be messy in practice. Even if the rebel leaders relent on their current firm rejection of any foreign troops on Libyan soil, specific incidents may give them a difficult time with their own people. The third assumption is that regional Arab involvement in a no-fly zone unequivocally aids the effort. Not necessarily; it depends on whose narrative carries the day.

Libyan state TV is portraying the Arab League’s secretary general, Amre Moussa, as a munafiq (hypocrite, but with connotations of treachery in Islamic history), bribed with US support for his presidential candidacy in Egypt. News of Egypt resuming exports of gas to Israel has been given prominence. The narrative of US/Israeli control over oil supplies and the Arab world is being pushed.

It may gain currency if the US continues to take a meeker stance in response to state repression of protests in Bahrain and Saudi Arabia. A weak stance may indeed be the price the US has to pay for Saudi support in Libya. In that case, however, it would be easier for Col Gaddafi to portray US concerns over violence in Libya as a hypocritical pretext, with the real motive being control over oil.

Individually, each of these risks can be mitigated. In combination, they must feature prominently in the calculations of the US and Col Gaddafi as they assess what lies within grasp and what could be fatal overreach.

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Related articles

• Gaddafi Does Not Expect Battle For Benghazi (news.sky.com)
• Libya envoy: World has 10 hours to act against Gaddafi (reuters.com)
• Red Cross pulls out of Benghazi (bbc.co.uk)
• Ground assault on Libyan rebels (bbc.co.uk)
• “UN talks on Libya no-fly zone due” and related posts (rocketnews.com)
• Gaddafi taunts critics, dares them to get him (reuters.com)